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Secular Invocations, the First 




The question posed by the Symposium is: “Is This a Christian 
Nation?”  As someone who has recently published a book called 
“Our Non-Christian Nation,”1 it was probably clear to the 
organizers what my view would be on the matter.  In that book, I 
described how, in a series of decisions over the course of the past 
two decades, the Supreme Court has opened up public life—
government property, institutions, and money—to religion and 
how, even though those decisions all of course benefitted the 
nation’s Christian majority, recently, non-Christians, including 
Atheists and other secularists, have rightly begun taking 
advantage of those decisions to participate in public life alongside 
the majority.2   
Thus, when the Court held in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris and 
Mitchell v. Helms that the government has wide discretion to funnel 
public money to Christian schools,3 Muslim schools and 
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.  Many thanks to
Conner Kingsley for terrific research assistance and to the organizers of the “Is 
This a Christian Nation?” conference for inviting me to participate. 
1. JAY WEXLER, OUR NON-CHRISTIAN NATION: HOW ATHEISTS, SATANISTS, 
PAGANS, AND OTHERS ARE DEMANDING THEIR RIGHTFUL PLACE IN PUBLIC LIFE
(2019). 
2. Id. at 6–8.
3. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002); Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000). 
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organizations representing all types of religious beliefs, from 
Scientology to the Hare Krishnas, started asking for (and receiving) 
public money as well.4  When the Court in Good News Club v. 
Milford Central School held that public schools must allow 
proselytizing Christian groups to use their classrooms after the end 
of the school day,5 secularists and Satanists started running their 
own clubs in those same classrooms.6  When the Court held in 
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette that the 
government can let private Christian groups put up their displays 
and monuments on government property opened up as a public 
forum,7 Wiccans and Atheists started putting up their own 
monuments in those forums.8  And when the Court said in Town of 
Greece v. Galloway that town boards can start their meetings off 
with sectarian prayers, so long as they do not discriminate on the 
basis of religion,9 individuals with all sorts of religious and 
nonreligious beliefs, from Hindus to Pagans to Satanists to 
secularists, started asking to give their own invocations, and many 
have in fact done so.10 
This phenomenon represents the fact that religious minorities 
(and nonbelievers, though from here on in I will simply include 
nonbelievers as a type of religious minority) have largely recognized 
that the Supreme Court is no longer particularly interested in 
keeping religion and the government separate.  Prior to the Court’s 
recent rightwing turn, exemplified by the appointment of 
separation skeptics such as Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch, the 
typical approach taken by minorities to church-state relations was 
to stay out of public life and fight in the courts for a jurisprudence 
more amenable to separationism.11  After all, one of the great 
promises of the Establishment Clause has always been to protect 
minorities from both the symbolic and substantive dominance of the 
4. See WEXLER, supra note 1, at 113, 115, 117, 120–21, 123.
5. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 (2001).
6. See WEXLER, supra note 1, at 149–51.
7. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 769–
70 (1995). 
8. See WEXLER, supra note 1, at 44–49.
9. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 591–92 (2014).
10. See WEXLER, supra note 1, at 63.
11. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005); Zelman v. Sim-
mons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 643–44 (2002). 
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Christian majority by creating a largely religion-free zone of public 
life where everyone, regardless of their religious views, feels equally 
valued and respected.  But as the Court’s approach to the 
Establishment Clause has changed over time (it is notable that the 
Court has not invalidated a single government practice under the 
clause in over fifteen years12) and with the recent personnel 
changes practically guaranteeing that this trend will continue for 
at least another generation, religious minorities have realized that 
we (as an Atheist I include myself here) need a new strategy to at 
least try to counter the dominance of the Christian majority in what 
might accurately now be described as a “post-separationist” 
America. 
In Our Non-Christian Nation, I argued that while a secular 
public square might be the ideal from the perspective of religious 
minorities, the religiously cacophonous public square created by 
this new movement is both the best option for minorities given the 
circumstances at the Supreme Court and, in fact, presents at least 
some unique possibilities to promote the interests of minorities 
even compared to the hypothetical secular public square.13  For 
instance, participating in public life can be experienced as 
empowering for religious minorities in a way that staying away 
from it cannot be, and a public square filled with religious and 
nonreligious voices of all kinds might result in a citizenry better 
educated with respect to religion and religious diversity than an 
entirely secular public square.14  Moreover, although the question 
is an empirical one with no clear answer yet, it is at least possible 
that a religiously diverse public square might result in more 
toleration and mutual respect among those who hold different 
beliefs and create the conditions for a more stable social peace than 
pure separationism.15  In any event, insisting on participating 
alongside Christians in public life has got to be a better option from 
the perspective of religious minorities than ceding the public square 
entirely to the majority.  Given that the Supreme Court does not 
seem like it will be turning the clock back on its Establishment 
12. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 901–02 (2005) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n., 139 S. Ct. 
2067, 2074 (2019); Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 591–92. 
13. See WEXLER, supra note 1, at 162–66.
14. See id. at 162–65.
15. See id. at 165–66.
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Clause jurisprudence any time soon, religious minorities are right 
to recognize that creation of a robust religious and nonreligious 
public pluralism is the best current option in a world of few other 
opportunities. 
Such pluralism, however, requires that the courts continue to 
recognize the dangers of discrimination.  The saving grace of the 
current Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has 
been its fairly consistent embrace of the notion that while the 
government can support religion in all sorts of ways, it cannot 
formally discriminate in its allocation of public goods among 
recipients based on the content of their religious or nonreligious 
commitments.  As the Court famously stated in its 1982 decision of 
Larson v. Valente, “[t]he clearest command of the Establishment 
Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially 
preferred over another.”16  As long as this principle remains 
ascendant, the possibility of a religiously cacophonous public 
square continues to exist—Christians can access government 
money, property, and institutions, but so can non-Christians. 
Christians can put up monuments on public property opened up to 
private speech, but so can Hindus, Taoists, and Zoroastrians, if they 
so choose.  Christian schools and organizations can use public 
money to further their missions, but so can Krishnas, Muslims, and 
Satanists.  Christians can start after-school clubs to promote their 
beliefs in public elementary and secondary schools, but so can Jews, 
Buddhists, and Confucians.  Christians can give invocations before 
town board meetings, but so can Wiccans, Sikhs, and Rastafarians. 
  For this pluralism to be anywhere near adequate, however, 
government resources must be equally available to nonreligious 
individuals and organizations, fully authorized to articulate 
nonreligious perspectives on questions typically addressed by 
religion.  In other words, a pluralism in which the only belief 
systems accorded the same treatment as Christianity are those that 
believe in some sort of divine being or have some other hallmark of 
traditional religion is a partial pluralism at best.  Nonreligious 
belief systems such as Ethical Culture or Secular Humanism seek 
to answer the same questions that religious belief systems 
address—what is the ultimate meaning of life, how are human 
beings related to the rest of the cosmos, what constitutes ethical 
human action, how can human beings find community, etc.?  A 
16. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
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public square that excludes these nonreligious alternatives to 
understanding fundamental issues relating to the place of human 
beings (among others) in the universe would be one that arbitrarily 
excludes the views of a substantial portion of the American 
population.  After all, although statistics like these are always 
rightfully subject to legitimate quibbling at the margins, the data 
show that somewhere around twenty-five percent of the population 
of the United States describe themselves as not believing in any 
religious belief system whatsoever.17 
Thus, to return to my examples, if we really care about 
religious pluralism, and monuments to Christ and Buddha and 
Satan can stand on public property opened to private speech, then 
a monument to Ethical Culture must be allowed as well.  If 
Buddhist and Christian and Hindu student groups can meet in 
public school classrooms after the school day is over to promulgate 
their beliefs, then secular groups must have the same courtesy.  If 
Scientologists and Krishnas and Christians can receive government 
funding for their social service organizations, then Humanist 
groups must be able to apply for the same funding sources.  And if 
Wiccans, Muslims, and Christians can give invocations before town 
board meetings, then Atheists must be allowed to the same. 
Moreover, they must be allowed to freely express their nonreligious 
beliefs in as “sectarian” a manner as anybody else. 
On this score, there is both good news and bad news.  The major 
good news is that, with respect to three of the four contexts I am 
describing—putting up displays and monuments, applying for 
government funding, and creating after-school programming—the 
bedrock First Amendment free speech principle that the 
government may not discriminate against speakers on the basis of 
viewpoint has, for the most part, resulted in the government 
formally treating Atheists and other secularists equally with 
religious believers.18  True, many attempts by secularists to take 
advantage of these opportunities have been met with hostility from 
government actors and dissenting individuals (Our Non-Christian 
Nation catalogs many of these incidents, including Atheist displays 
being torn down and school officials discouraging secular students 
17. See WEXLER, supra note 1, at 6.
18. See WEXLER, supra note 1, at 44–49, 120–21, 149–51; see also Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52–54 (1985).
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from starting their own organizations19), but at least the law on the 
books protects the rights of those who describe themselves as 
nonreligious on an equal basis with religious believers.20 
The other bit of good news has to do with secular invocations. 
Not long after Justice Kennedy made clear in Town of Greece that 
government units sponsoring invocations must “maintain[ ] a policy 
of nondiscrimination,”21  Atheists and other secularists, both 
individually and in connection with organizations like Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State, the Freedom from 
Religion Foundation, and the Central Florida Freethought 
Community, began asking to give their own invocations before town 
meetings and were invited to do so by cities and towns and states 
across the country.22  Nobody knows for sure how many secular 
invocations have been offered nationwide, but the number is likely 
somewhere between one hundred and two hundred.23  Some of 
these secular invocations caused controversy, of course, but many 
of them proceeded without incident.24  Invocations are particularly 
useful from the perspective of religious pluralism because they 
allow the speaker to talk about their deeply held beliefs to a 
basically captive audience of mostly politically active local 
citizens.25  An invocation, as we will see, can essentially serve as a 
short lesson about the content of a belief system as well as 
demonstrate to a perhaps ignorant audience that those who hold 
such beliefs are themselves responsible and thoughtful members of 
the community.26  This is at least as true for secularists as it is for 
those who believe in traditional religions.  Perhaps nothing better 
has come from the Court’s line of separation-eroding church-state 
decisions than the upsurge of invocations given by religious 
minorities, including secularists. 
19. See WEXLER, supra note 1, at 47–48, 149.
20. See id. at 7.
21. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S 565, 585 (2014).
22. See infra notes 73–105 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 99–103 and accompanying text.
25. For some examples of secular invocations, see infra notes 92–96 and
accompanying text. 
26. See infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
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Alas, this is where the distressing news comes in.  In response 
to the increasing demand for secular invocations, several 
jurisdictions—Brevard County, Florida; the Pennsylvania House of 
Representatives; and the United States House of Representatives, 
most prominently—have declared their invocation practices off-
limits to nonbelievers.27  In each case, secularists, supported by 
separationist legal groups, challenged these policies in the courts 
as violations of their First Amendment rights and, in particular, the 
part of Town of Greece prohibiting the government from 
discriminating when it selects who will give invocations before 
public meetings.28  All three cases were ultimately decided by 
federal circuit courts, with the government winning two out of the 
three disputes.29 
Specifically, challengers won in Florida but lost in both the 
Pennsylvania and the United States Houses of Representatives.  In 
Williamson v. Brevard County, the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals avoided the question of whether the government can solely 
exclude secularists from its invocation programs based on its 
finding that the county board had in fact discriminated against a 
wide variety of minority religious faiths when selecting prayer-
givers.30  In Fields v. Speaker of the Pennsylvania House of 
Representatives, a split panel of the Third Circuit held that the 
Pennsylvania House was within its rights to exclude Atheists from 
its invocation program given that one of the primary purposes of its 
invocations was to ask for “divine guidance.”31  And in Barker v. 
Conroy, the D.C. Circuit, in an opinion by supposedly-liberal legal-
lion David Tatel, summarily upheld the U.S. House of 
Representatives’ policy of excluding secular invocations by pointing 
to the historical tradition of legislative prayer in the United 
27. See infra notes Section III.A.; see also Williamson v. Brevard County,
928 F.3d 1296, 1298 (11th Cir. 2019); Fields v. Speaker of Pa. H.R., 936 F.3d 
142, 146 (3d Cir. 2019); Barker v. Conroy, 921 F.3d 1118, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
28. Williamson, 928 F.3d at 1298; Fields, 936 F.3d at 147; Barker, 921 F.3d
at 1121. 
29. Williamson, 928 F.3d at 1317; Fields, 936 F.3d at 163; Barker, 921 F.3d
at 1131–32. 
30. See Williamson, 928 F.3d at 1316.
31. Fields, 936 F.3d at 147.
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States,32 which, true enough, has likely not included many secular 
prayers. 
In this Article, I will argue that the decisions of the Third and 
D.C. Circuits are poorly reasoned, violate the basic First
Amendment principle that the government may not discriminate
on the basis of religion or viewpoint, wrongly sidestep the Supreme
Court’s admonition in Town of Greece that legislative prayer
practices must be nondiscriminatory, and threaten to substantially
undermine the religious pluralism that is the only real advantage
to the Court’s recent pro-religion Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.  While the Court’s references in Town of Greece to
non-discrimination norms are far from fully developed or crystal
clear in their import, the best reading of them suggests that they
constitute an additional requirement beyond whatever might be
justified by the nation’s historical practices regarding invocations
before public meetings.  The requirement of non-discrimination
incorporates the basic, modern First Amendment principles that
the government may not discriminate amongst religions or between
religion and non-religion and that it may not discriminate on the
basis of viewpoint when allocating public resources such as the
opportunity to speak before government bodies.33  A practice that
fits within our historical tradition of legislative prayer but fails the
non-discrimination requirement should be held unconstitutional.
Of course, the government need not provide everyone who 
wants to speak before a public meeting an opportunity to do so, 
regardless of what they might say; in other words, nobody has the 
right to give an invocation about their favorite football team or the 
state of their marriage or even necessarily about the importance of 
a pristine environment.  Under ordinary principles of First 
Amendment law as it applies in designated public forums, the 
government may limit the subject matter of invocations even if it 
may not exclude speech because of its viewpoint.34  Fleshing out 
this requirement, I argue for the following approach: Subject to 
certain content-neutral requirements (regarding timing, for 
example, or even perhaps the speaker’s geographical connection to 
the relevant government body), the government must treat as 
32. Barker, 921 F.3d at 1131.
33. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 585–88 (2014).
34. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
829–30 (1995). 
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equals, for purposes of determining who may give an invocation, 
any person who purports to speak on behalf of a belief system that 
would violate the Establishment Clause if it were put forward by 
the government as truth.35  Since the government would violate the 
Establishment Clause just as surely by proclaiming that there is no 
god as it would if it proclaimed that Jesus is the son of God or that 
Thetans must clear the planet, then it follows that the government 
may not exclude those speaking on behalf of Atheist organizations 
from giving invocations before public meetings. 
The Article proceeds as follows:  In Part I, I describe briefly the 
Supreme Court’s two decisions on legislative prayer, Marsh v. 
Chambers and Town of Greece v. Galloway, and argue that the 
insistence in those cases that the government maintain a policy of 
non-discrimination when implementing pre-meeting prayer 
practices constitutes an additional obligation beyond the 
requirement that the practice falls within the nation’s historical 
traditions.  In Part II, I describe the response of religious minorities 
to Town of Greece, focusing specifically on the coordinated 
movement among Atheists and others to offer secular invocations 
before government bodies across the country, including in some 
surprising conservative southern locales.  By looking at some 
specific examples of secular invocations given in the past few years, 
I argue that the secular invocation represents a unique opportunity 
to promote religious pluralism in the United States by allowing 
secularists to explain their beliefs before captive audiences of 
politically-active citizens.  I argue that government bodies should 
allow—indeed, should welcome, even solicit—secular invocations as 
a way of furthering religious pluralism.  In Part III, I turn to the 
courts and the First Amendment.  Section A of that Part describes 
the three judicial decisions on the issue of whether excluding 
Atheists from invocation practices violates the First Amendment. 
Section B of that Part critiques the decisions of the D.C. and Third 
Circuits and then offers a practical test for determining the proper 
set of possible invocation-givers within which courts should enforce 
the non-discrimination requirement of Town of Greece—a set that 
must include secularists. 
35. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
46, 48–51 (1987). 
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I. THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGISLATIVE PRAYER
The Supreme Court has decided two cases about the 
constitutionality of starting government meetings with a prayer or 
invocation—Marsh v. Chambers in 1983,36 and Town of Greece v. 
Galloway in 2014.37  The issue in Marsh was whether the Nebraska 
legislature’s practice of starting every session off with a prayer 
offered by its publicly-funded Presbyterian chaplain, Robert 
Palmer, violated the First Amendment.38  In a six–three decision 
authored by Chief Justice Burger, the Court upheld the Nebraska 
House’s practice.39  The decision was thinly reasoned and failed 
entirely to grapple with any of the potential harms of legislative 
prayer that Justices Brennan and Stevens identified in their 
dissents.40 Instead, Burger rested his conclusion of 
constitutionality simply on the grounds that the Nebraska House’s 
practice fit comfortably within the nation’s historical tradition of 
legislative prayer.41  Noting that the same Congress that drafted 
the Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment, had just days 
earlier passed a statute authorizing payment for House and Senate 
chaplains, the majority opinion concluded that, “[c]learly the men 
who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses did not view paid 
legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that 
Amendment.”42  The key language in the decision reads as follows: 
  The opening of sessions of legislative and other 
deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded 
in the history and tradition of this country.  From colonial 
times through the founding of the Republic and ever since, 
the practice of legislative prayer has coexisted with the 
principles of disestablishment and religious freedom. . . .  
. . . . 
36. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784 (1983).
37. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 569–70 (2014).
38. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784–85.
39. Id. at 795.
40. See id. at 795–98 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see id. at 822–24 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). 
41. Id. at 790, 793 (majority opinion).
42. Id. at 788.
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  In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of 
more than 200 years, there can be no doubt that the 
practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has 
become part of the fabric of our society.  To invoke Divine 
guidance on a public body entrusted with making the laws 
is not, in these circumstances, an “establishment” of 
religion or a step toward establishment; it is simply a 
tolerable acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among 
the people of this country.43 
The primary holding of the case, then, is that, in general, 
legislative prayers do not violate the Establishment Clause because 
legislatures in the United States, both at the national and state 
levels, have started their sessions with prayers throughout the 
country’s history, reaching back to even before the final language of 
the Establishment Clause was finished.44  But that is not the only 
point of law contained in the opinion.  In the brief, four-paragraph 
third section of the opinion, the Court also rejected claims that 
particular aspects of the Nebraska practice violated the 
Establishment Clause, including the fact that Palmer had occupied 
the chaplain’s office for sixteen years and that his prayers were 
“Judeo-Christian” in nature. 45  The seeds of understanding Town 
of Greece’s non-discrimination requirement can be found in the 
Court’s answer to these arguments.  
As to the first of these objections, the Court found that the 
selection of a single person was acceptable because it did not 
“advanc[e] the beliefs of a particular church”46 and because there 
was no proof that his continued selection had “stemmed from an 
impermissible motive.”47  Rather, the Court found Palmer had been 
“reappointed because his performance and personal qualities were 
acceptable to the body appointing him.”48  The Court’s assertion 
that choosing one person from one denomination to be the chaplain 
for sixteen straight years does not advance that denomination is of 
course quite ludicrous, but the important doctrinal point is that the 
43. Id. at 786, 792.
44. See id. at 787–89.
45. Id. at 792–95.
46. Id. at 793.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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Court seems to have added here a new requirement for legislative 
prayer—it must not “advance[ ] the beliefs of a particular church.”49  
By inference, if the Court had found that the practice in Nebraska 
had “advance[d] the beliefs of a particular church,” presumably 
because of some “impermissible motive” of the legislature, then the 
practice would have violated the Establishment Clause.50  In 
response to the challenger’s objection to the “Judeo-Christian” 
nature of Palmer’s prayers, the Court said that “[t]he content of the 
prayer is not of concern to judges where, as here, there is no 
indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to 
proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or 
belief.”51  This suggests that not only must a legislative prayer 
practice (1) not advance a belief or church, but it also must (2) not 
proselytize, and (3) not disparage any faith or belief. 
Almost everything about these requirements is a mystery. 
With regard to their content—what counts as advancement or 
proselytization or disparagement—the only thing we know from 
Marsh is that appointment of one chaplain for sixteen years does 
not constitute “advancing” a belief.  We certainly do not know why 
that is true.  Beyond the content, though, the legal source of the 
requirements is also unclear.  The Court provides no illuminating 
citations and no explanation.52  One possibility, of course, is that 
they come from the historical practice itself.  In other words, 
perhaps the reasoning is that the historical practice of legislative 
prayer, in its entirety, over nearly two-hundred years, has 
consistently not advanced, proselytized, or disparaged any faith, 
belief, or church and that therefore, to fit into that tradition, a 
contemporary prayer practice must not do any of those things 
either.  But the Court made no effort whatsoever to demonstrate 
that the historical practice failed to do those things, and indeed it 
did not even assert such a conclusion.  It seems likely that in some 
ways, in some times and places, the practice of legislative prayer 
certainly did do some of those things, at least to some degree. 
The better way to read this part of Marsh is that the 
requirement of non-advancement/proselytization/disparagement is 
49. Id.
50. Id. at 793–94.
51. Id. at 794–95.
52. Id. at 793.
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an independent requirement beyond the mere “consistent with 
historic practice” criteria that justifies legislative prayer under the 
Establishment Clause in the first instance.  Not only did the Court 
make no attempt to ground the requirements in the historical 
practice itself, but the requirements are consistent with general 
Religion Clause jurisprudence outside the legislative prayer 
context.  Even by 1983, the Court had set out the general rules that 
the government may not advance or inhibit or endorse or 
disapprove of religion, and although the Court in Marsh notoriously 
refused to apply the Lemon test to the practice of legislative prayer, 
the requirements of non-advancement and non-disparagement are 
closely aligned with that test.53 
In Town of Greece, the divided Court applied Marsh to uphold 
a northern New York town’s practice of starting its board meetings 
off with a prayer.54  The practice differed from the practice in Marsh 
in several key ways—the prayers were given by guest speakers 
rather than an official chaplain; they were fully sectarian in the 
sense that they regularly and substantially referred to specific 
aspects of the Christian faith (in Marsh, Chaplain Palmer had 
stopped referring to Christ after a Jewish legislator complained55); 
and they were given in the context of a town meeting, attended by 
members of the community, some of whom at any given meeting 
might have had business before the board, rather than before a 
legislative body.56  Five Justices held that none of these differences 
rendered Greece’s practice unconstitutional, resting their decision 
largely on a straightforward application of Marsh, which Justice 
Kennedy described “stands for the proposition that it is not 
necessary to define the precise boundary of the Establishment 
Clause where history shows that the specific practice is 
permitted.”57  At the same time, however, the Court made it clear 
that “Marsh must not be understood as permitting a practice that 
53. See id. at 792–95; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13
(1971) (articulating what would be known as the Lemon test as: “First, the 
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or pri-
mary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the 
statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’” 
(citations omitted)). 
54. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 591–92 (2014).
55. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n.14.
56. For the facts of the case, see Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 570–72.
57. Id. at 577.
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would amount to a constitutional violation if not for its historical 
foundation.”58 
Specifically, as to the sectarian nature of the prayers in Town 
of Greece, the Court observed that such explicitly sectarian 
language had been common at the time of the framing of the 
Establishment Clause and thus fit within the relevant historic 
tradition.  “The Congress that drafted the First Amendment[,]” 
Justice Kennedy wrote, “would have been accustomed to 
invocations containing explicitly religious themes of the sort 
respondents find objectionable.”59  As in Marsh, however, the Court 
did not end its analysis with history alone.  Reiterating Marsh’s 
point that the content of legislative prayers is irrelevant absent an 
“indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to 
proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or 
belief,”60 the Court this time around provided some details about 
what might constitute advancement, disparagement, or 
proselytization: 
In rejecting the suggestion that legislative prayer must be 
nonsectarian, the Court does not imply that no constraints 
remain on its content.  The relevant constraint derives from 
its place at the opening of legislative sessions, where it is 
meant to lend gravity to the occasion and reflect values 
long part of the Nation’s heritage.  Prayer that is solemn 
and respectful in tone, that invites lawmakers to reflect 
upon shared ideals and common ends before they embark 
on the fractious business of governing, serves that 
legitimate function.  If the course and practice over time 
shows that the invocations denigrate nonbelievers or 
religious minorities, threaten damnation, or preach 
conversion, many present may consider the prayer to fall 
short of the desire to elevate the purpose of the occasion 
and to unite lawmakers in their common effort.  That 
circumstance would present a different case than the one 
presently before the Court.61 
58. Id. at 576.
59. Id. at 578.
60. Id. at 581.
61. Id. at 582–83.
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This passage further underscores that general conformity with 
historical tradition is necessary but not sufficient to uphold any 
given legislative prayer practice.  The requirement that the prayer 
practice also fails to advance, denigrate, or proselytize is an 
independent one that is derived not from historical practice—
indeed, as in Marsh, the Court in Greece does not assert, much less 
make any effort to support, the notion that the historical practice 
failed to do any of these things—but rather from the current 
purposes of legislative prayer in the modern day, which the Court 
identified as lending gravity to the occasion and reflecting historical 
values (which of course may not have always been realized) of 
“shared ideals and common ends.”62  Read together with the Court’s 
earlier observation that “Marsh must not be understood as 
permitting a practice that would amount to a constitutional 
violation if not for its historical foundation,”63 this passage makes 
it fairly clear that legislative prayer practices are subject to 
constitutional requirements beyond simply being generally aligned 
with the nation’s historical practice. 
Further support for this reading of Town of Greece comes from 
Justice Kennedy’s treatment of the plaintiffs’ argument that town 
board prayers are unconstitutionally coercive in a way that 
legislative prayers are not.  In rejecting this argument, Justice 
Kennedy, writing only for himself, the Chief Justice, and Justice 
Alito, clearly recognized that a prayer practice may not coerce 
attendees into participating in the prayer.64  This requirement, 
however, was not drawn from any historical tradition, but rather 
from an independent constitutional source, specifically the 
“elemental First Amendment principle that government may not 
coerce its citizens ‘to support or participate in any religion or its 
exercise.’”65  Justice Kennedy found, based on the facts in the 
record, that Greece had not “compelled its citizens to engage in a 
religious observance,”66 but he further observed that “[t]he analysis 
would be different if town board members directed the public to 
participate in the prayers, singled out dissidents for opprobrium, or 
62. Id. at 583.
63. Id. at 576.
64. Id. at 591.
65. Id. at 586 (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)). 
66. Id. at 587.
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indicated that their decisions might be influenced by a person’s 
acquiescence in the prayer opportunity.”67  Again, Justice Kennedy 
made no attempt whatsoever to argue that the historical tradition 
of town board prayers had been consistently non-coercive in these 
ways (indeed, the opinion’s sole reference to the purported 
historical tradition of local government prayer consists of one report 
of one city council’s proceedings from 191068), thus further lending 
support to the argument that avoiding coercion is a constitutional 
requirement independent of and additional to general conformity 
with historical tradition. 
Thus far, then, Marsh and Town of Greece appear to hold that 
(1) the government may engage in a practice of starting sessions off
with a prayer without violating the Establishment Clause if the
practice generally fits within the historical tradition of such prayers
in the United States, so long as (2) the practice does not advance a
religious belief, denigrate non-believers or minorities, or
proselytize/preach conversion, and (3) the practice does not coerce
nonbelievers into participating in the prayer.  Requirements two
and three seem to have their source in fairly noncontroversial
readings of the First Amendment and are to be measured
independently of any historical tradition.
The final doctrinal piece of Town of Greece is its requirement of 
nondiscrimination, which should be understood in the same way as 
the requirements of non-advancement, non-disparagement, non-
proselytization, and non-coercion—in other words, as an 
independent constitutional obligation.  In response to the argument 
that “the town of Greece contravened the Establishment Clause by 
inviting a predominantly Christian set of ministers to lead the 
prayer,”69 the Court was satisfied that the town had both made 
“reasonable efforts” to identify the religious organizations within 
its borders and had indicated it would “welcome a prayer by any 
minister or layman who wished to give one.”70  Justice Kennedy 
concluded that: “[s]o long as the town maintains a policy of 
nondiscrimination, the Constitution does not require it to search 
beyond its borders for non-Christian prayer givers in an effort to 
67. Id. at 588.
68. Id. at 576.
69. Id. at 585.
70. Id.
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achieve religious balancing.”71  Of course, Justice Kennedy did not 
expound on what precisely this nondiscrimination requirement 
entails or where it comes from, but this failure to specify is 
understandable if the requirement simply represents the obvious 
First Amendment mandate that the government may not prefer one 
belief system over any other belief system and may not discriminate 
on the basis of viewpoint in any type of government forum.  The 
Court might very well have introduced this nondiscrimination 
requirement in the same way it introduced its non-coercion 
requirement, namely as “an elemental First Amendment 
principle.”72  That is certainly how many of the nation’s secular 
individuals and organizations understood it, as detailed in the next 
Part. 
II. SECULAR INVOCATIONS AFTER TOWN OF GREECE
Although secularists had given invocations before public bodies 
prior to the Court’s decision in Town of Greece,73 it was that 
decision, and specifically Justice Kennedy’s observation about 
nondiscrimination, that sparked a substantial increase in the 
number of secular invocations that have been given before 
legislatures and town boards across the nation.  Much of this 
increase can be attributed to the concentrated efforts of a small 
number of influential secularist and separationist organizations, 
such as Americans United for Separation of Church and State 
(Americans United), the American Humanist Association (AHA), 
the Freedom from Religion Foundation (FFRF), and the Central 
Florida Freethought Community (CFFC), all of which pounced on 
the Court’s anti-discrimination language to start campaigns aimed 
at ensuring and increasing diversity and pluralism in the country’s 
prayer practices. 
As part of its “Operation Inclusion” program, for example, 
Americans United developed legal guidelines for what is and is not 
allowed under Town of Greece, drafted a model secular invocation 
71. Id. at 585–86.
72. Id. at 586.
73. See, e.g., Invocations from Other Areas, CENT. FLA. FREETHOUGHT
CMTY., https://www.cflfreethought.org/invocations [perma.cc/JY4Y-YQSZ] 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2021) (collecting links to invocations both after and before 
Town of Greece).  According to this source, secular invocations had been given 
very occasionally before Town of Greece was decided in 2014, going back at 
least until 2004.  Id. 
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for members and other nonbelievers to use for their own 
invocations, and actively began monitoring the practices of 
localities to ensure that minorities were being treated fairly and 
equally.74  The Operation Inclusion webpage clearly links these 
efforts to the Court’s decision in Town of Greece, noting that: 
The [Town of Greece] ruling was a bad decision, but the 
Court did make it clear that the First Amendment imposes 
limits on local governments that open their meetings with 
ceremonial prayers.  Towns cannot discriminate on the 
basis of religion; town leaders cannot lead others in prayers 
or integrate worship into the legislative process; and 
invocations cannot proselytize or denigrate other belief 
systems.75   
A key part of Operation Inclusion focuses on mobilizing members to 
become actively involved in making sure that if a town or other 
locality does maintain a prayer practice, it does so consistent with 
the Court’s anti-discrimination mandate: 
Operation Inclusion is an initiative to . . . MOBILIZE our 
chapters across the country, as well as independent 
activists, to certify that the rules are being followed and 
that minority perspectives—especially non-Christian and 
non-theist viewpoints—are not discriminated against.  We 
will equip people to approach their local boards and 
councils to request the opportunity to offer an opening 
message that is inclusive and stresses the importance of 
church-state separation.  We will establish a vehicle for 
activists and other citizens to report back to us when 
municipalities discriminate against would-be speakers or 
violate the spirit or principles of the Supreme Court’s 
decision by not including everyone.76 
74. See Operation Inclusion, AMS. UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE, https://www.au.org/content/operation-inclusion [perma.cc/ZR23-SAL3] 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2021). 
75. Id.
76. Id.
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The AHA, for its part, launched its secular invocation program 
the very same day that the Court announced Town of Greece.77  In 
its May 5, 2014, press release, the AHA observed that:  
The Supreme Court’s ruling, authored by Justice Kennedy, 
makes clear that local governments must make 
“reasonable efforts to identify all of the congregations 
located within its borders” and welcome an invocation by 
anyone who wishes to give one, regardless of their faith. 
The majority decision also states that the policy must be 
one of nondiscrimination.78 
The program, known as “The Humanist Society,” allows individuals 
to apply for approval as “Humanist Invocators,” and includes an 
interactive map to help Humanists identify people in their areas 
who would be willing and able to give nonreligious invocations.79  
Also in 2014, FFRF created its “Nothing Fails Like Prayer” 
competition to award five-hundred dollar prizes for the year’s best 
secular invocations.80  The prizes have been awarded every year 
since and FFRF explicitly intends them to “be a Paine in the 
government’s Mass—a Thomas Paine.”81 
Perhaps no organization has had as much of an impact on 
spreading the practice of secular invocations than the CFFC, a 
chapter of FFRF headquartered in the Orlando area.  Led by 
activist David Williamson, the CFFC engages in a wide variety of 
secularist activities, educating members and non-members alike 
about the law surrounding state-sponsored religion and serving as 
a watchdog group in communities that often cross constitutional 
77. See Humanist Group Launches Secular Invocations Program in Re-
sponse to Supreme Court’s Ruling, AM. HUMANIST ASS’N, https://americanhu-
manist.org/news/2014-05-humanist-group-launches-secular-invocations-pro-
gram/ [perma.cc/UC5S-GQVJ] (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).  
78. Id.
79. See Humanist Invocations, THE HUMANIST SOC’Y, www.thehumanistso-
ciety.org/invocations [perma.cc/UD8S-J8YV] (last visited Feb. 8, 2021). 
80. ‘Nothing Fails Like Prayer’ contest, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUND.,
https://ffrf.org/outreach/nothing-fails-like-prayer [https://perma.cc/8S4F-
ERHY] (last visited Feb. 8, 2021). 
81. Id.
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lines.82  With respect to invocations, the group says this on their 
website:  
We maintain that religious prayer has no place at local 
government meetings since members of the public attend 
and participate.  However, in light of the May, 2014 
Supreme Court decision in Town of Greece v. Galloway, the 
best possible action we can take is to ensure that all venues 
include diverse perspectives.  This includes providing 
opportunities for all faith traditions and non-believers 
seeking the opportunity to participate and ensuring that no 
pattern of prayer exists which denigrates, proselytizes, or 
advances any one religion or disparages any other.83   
To this end, CFFC members have asked to give (and have given) 
secular invocations all over central Florida, in conservative locales 
like Volusia, Lake, and Osceola counties.84  The group also keeps 
an invaluable running record of all the invocations that its 
members have given in central Florida, as well as many secular 
invocations given by others in different parts of the country.85  The 
website lists and provides links to the text and/or videos for ninety 
invocations that members of the organization have given in central 
Florida and about forty given by others elsewhere in the country 
since the Town of Greece decision was handed down.86   
It is not clear exactly how many secular invocations have been 
given that are not catalogued on the CFFC website, but there are 
some, which suggests that the total number of secular invocations 
given in the United States since 2014 is at least somewhat higher 
than the one-hundred and thirty or so that are listed.87  Humanists 
and other secularists have given invocations across the country, 
from Maine to Arizona, from Florida to Washington State.88  Most 
of the invocations have taken place before local boards, from small 
towns like Shelbyville, Kentucky and Oskaloosa, Iowa to larger 
82. See generally CENT. FLA. FREETHOUGHT CMTY., https://www.cflfree-
thought.org/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2021). 
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cities like New Orleans, Louisiana and Lubbock, Texas.89  Some 
have been given before state legislative bodies, including the 
Arizona House of Representatives, the Iowa State House, and the 
Pennsylvania Senate, among others.90  As I will discuss below, 
many of the invocations have gone smoothly, but by no means have 
all of them. 
It is hard to generalize about the content of these secular 
invocations, but certain themes tend to repeat themselves.  Many 
secular invocations begin by asking the audience specifically not to 
bow their heads but instead to look around at the people around 
them.  Illustrative is the invocation given by Arizona 
Representative Athena Salman, who, in her April 18, 2017, speech 
before the Arizona House of Representatives, opened by saying: 
“Take a moment to look around you at the people gathered today.  
We come from a variety of backgrounds and interests, but the 
passion that ignites us; the fire that burns within us; is similar.”91  
Likewise, Humanist Luke Douglas started his invocation before the 
Scottsdale, Arizona, City Council meeting on January 14, 2020, 
with:  
Rather than closing our eyes or bowing our heads, it is 
customary in a Humanist invocation to keep one’s eyes 
open.  Look around at your neighbors, your colleagues, your 
fellow Human beings.  Humanists have no holy books, only 
the literature and philosophy of humans who have gone 
before, whose ideas stand or fall on their own merit.92 
The notion that people should start off a public meeting by 
looking around at one’s fellow humans and citizens is consistent 
with another primary theme of many secular invocations—the 
importance of equality and inclusion.  A perfect example of an 
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. John Nichols, An Arizona Legislator Gave an Invocation That Didn’t




92. Hemant Mehta, Atheist Cites Lucifer in Invocation During Scottsdale
(AZ) City Council Meeting, FRIENDLY ATHEIST (Jan. 17, 2020), https://friend-
lyatheist.patheos.com/2020/01/17/atheist-cites-lucifer-in-invocation-during-
scottsdale-az-city-council-meeting/ [perma.cc/T8ZY-TRZF]. 
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invocation that invokes inclusivity as a core value is the one given 
by Nick Lee, a member of the San Antonio chapter of Americans 
United, in September of 2018 before the San Antonio City Council: 
This morning, I do not ask you to bow your heads in prayer. 
Rather, I draw your attention to the citizens who are 
gathered here today to do business with the city.  They 
come from different economic circumstances and from 
ethnic backgrounds.  Yet, they all hope to receive from you 
an equitable hearing of their concerns.  And beyond this 
room, I ask you to remember all one-and-a-half million 
people whom you are collectively pledged to serve. 
Consider the diversity of cultures, economic interests and 
religious backgrounds which are represented in this 
community.  In terms of religion, this includes not only the 
many varieties of Christians, but also Jews, Muslims, 
Hindus, Sikhs, atheists, and others . . . .  These citizens of 
San Antonio look to each of you to apply wisdom, integrity, 
and rational thinking to the affairs of the city, and to treat 
all fairly and without favor.93 
A third, fairly common theme found among secular invocations 
is the importance and centrality of reason to the human condition, 
and specifically to the process of governing in a democratic society. 
An example comes from United Coalition of Reason member, Ed 
Sweeney, in his invocation before the Upper Arlington City Council 
Meeting in Ohio: 
In this room, let us cherish and celebrate our shared 
humanness and capacity for reason.  Let us celebrate our 
compassion for the people of our City; the love for our 
Constitution and our democracy.  Reason has the power to 
solve even the most challenging problems, while 
cultivating intelligent, moral and ethical interactions 
93. Rob Boston, Historic Invocation: For the First Time Ever, A San Anto-
nio City Council Meeting Began With A Secular Reflection—And Americans 
United Activists Led the Way, AMS. UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE (Nov. 2018), https://www.au.org/church-state/november-2018-church-
state/featured/historic-invocation-for-the-first-time-ever-a-san 
[https://perma.cc/T54K-RRK3]. 
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among people of varying backgrounds and beliefs or non-
beliefs.94   
Another example can be found in CFFC member Joseph 
Richardson’s invocation in Eustis, Florida, in May of 2017: 
It is through reason that, more than 2,200 years ago, with 
nothing more than shadows and a little geometry, 
Eratosthenes was able to show that the Earth was indeed 
a sphere and calculate its circumference to within [one 
percent].  It is through reason that 300 years ago we began 
the Enlightenment and struggled our way out of the 
darkness and superstition of the Middle Ages.  Through 
reason, Einstein made predictions about the cosmos that 
we are still confirming 100 years later.  Through reason, 
we know that we are intimately connected, not only to 
every other human, but also to every living thing.  Despite 
the advances of reason, we are all wrong about something. 
It is a continuous, life-long effort to be “less wrong” and to 
use new information and reason to achieve that goal.  You 
have the opportunity to do that again tonight.  You will 
receive new information and make decisions about that 
information.  I urge you to exercise empathy to understand 
how your constituents feel, to use compassion to consider 
how your decisions will affect them, and to apply reason in 
the evaluation of all things.95 
As illustrated by the invocation’s phrase, “we know that we are 
intimately connected, not only to every other human, but also to 
every living thing,” another common theme found in secular 
invocations is the celebration of science, nature, and the 
relationship between human beings and nature.  Consider, for 
example, Althena Salman’s 2019 invocation before the Arizona 
House of Representatives: 
94. Secular Invocation: Ed Sweeney, FREETHOUGHT TODAY (June/July
2017), https://ffrf.org/publications/freethought-today/item/29695-secular-invo-
cation-ed-sweeney [perma.cc/8LEX-A24X]. 
95. Hemant Mehta, An Atheists’ Godless Invocation in Eustis (FL) is “Cor-
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Take a moment to reflect on the wonders of the universe. 
Bask in the awe and magnificence of the diversity of 
nature.  Look upon the soaring mountains, the vast seas, 
the cloud-studded azure skies.  Ponder how living things 
became so immensely diverse on our life-giving planet, how 
integrated and interdependent is all life meshed on our 
wondrous Earth.  Can we truly fathom the depth of the 
intricacies required to produce and sustain living beings 
such as animals, plants, microbes, the engines that support 
the survival of such diverse lifeforms on an incredibly 
insignificant planet in an insignificant galaxy in an 
insignificant corner of an unimaginably immense universe 
that may possibly be a single speck floating in a sea of 
universes?  The wonders of nature dwell deep in the hearts 
and minds of all people living on this wondrous rock we call 
Earth, as it makes its endless journey around a life-giving 
star we call sol.  No matter what we may call it, we give 
thanks to the awe and inspiring power of nature itself.96 
Obviously, any person who delivers a secular invocation will 
have their own individual concerns and style and so the content of 
any given invocation will be unique to that individual, but the 
themes I have described over the past few pages—celebration of 
nature, reason, compassion, equality, and inclusivity—are without 
a doubt some of the more prominent themes found in these types of 
invocations.  That should not be surprising, of course, since they are 
also some of the more prominent values held by secular 
organizations and their members generally.   
Although legislative prayer is deeply problematic from the 
perspective of keeping religion and the government separate, it 
can—if managed correctly—provide some important social benefits. 
Specifically, allowing a diverse set of religious and nonreligious 
believers to address a political meeting can at least theoretically 
serve an important educative function.  The speaker is given 
several minutes to speak about their core beliefs and values and 
how those values should be taken into account during the governing 
96. Hemant Mehta, AZ Atheists Lawmaker Gives Invocation, Then Gets
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process.  The audience is largely captive and made up of both civic 
leaders and politically-engaged citizens.  It is not hard to reimagine 
the pre-meeting invocation as a form of teaching.  Not only can the 
invocation explain to the audience what, objectively, the speaker 
and their organization believe, but the speakers themselves can 
provide a model for the belief system that they represent.  Imagine 
an attendee who knows very little about Hinduism, for instance, 
and perhaps has never met a Hindu person or heard one speak 
about their beliefs.  By affording a Hindu speaker the opportunity 
to address the audience, the practice of legislative prayer allows the 
Hindu speaker to explain what Hindus believe and to provide a 
concrete example of a Hindu for the attendee to have in mind as he 
or she leaves the meeting to participate in a society that is becoming 
more and more diverse every day.  Many people of all stripes have 
inaccurate and incomplete understandings of religious minorities 
and hold stereotypical views about their practitioners.  Legislative 
prayer programs, assuming they include a diverse set of speakers, 
can help address this problem. 
The last point, though, is the kicker.  To perform their 
educative function, the programs must be diverse and include a 
pluralistic set of believers and nonbelievers to provide a full picture 
of society’s religiosity.  A prayer program in which every speaker is 
a Christian will be far less educative than one which involves a wide 
range of speakers.  This is as true with respect to nonbelievers as it 
is with minority religious believers.  A full religious education must 
include education about those who do not believe in any sort of god 
in addition to those who believe in all sorts of different gods.  What 
do secularists believe?  Can they be good without god?  Are they 
outcasts?  Dangerous?  Do they want to destroy religion or co-exist 
with it?  So many people in the United States identify as 
nonbelievers that there is no way to understand the nation’s 
religious landscape without understanding what and how 
nonbelievers think.  True religious pluralism must include 
nonreligious perspectives on the questions addressed by religion.  It 
follows that to fulfill their educative potential, legislative prayer 
practices must include nonbelievers. 
Thus, the silver lining in the cloud that is Town of Greece is 
Justice Kennedy’s anti-discrimination warning.  It is hardly 
surprising that so many minority religious and nonreligious 
individuals seized on Justice Kennedy’s admonition to begin asking 
towns and other government bodies if they could participate in their 
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legislative prayer programs.  To the extent that those governmental 
bodies have allowed or invited a diverse set of speakers, including 
Atheists and other secularists, they should be applauded for 
promoting religious pluralism.  Every governmental unit that 
starts its meetings off with an invocation should include—indeed, 
actively solicit—nonbelievers to participate in their program. 
Given the benefits of pluralism, as well as the seeming 
universality of many secularist values, one might expect that most 
places would in fact allow secular invocations.  And indeed, the 
typical secular invocation has given rise to little if no controversy. 
Most secular invocations have gone smoothly, as planned, with no 
vocal disapproval from the community.  Indeed, when I spoke with 
David Williamson in 2015 about the CFFC’s invocation program, he 
told me that he has encountered “very little opposition” to the 
group’s efforts.  One particular example of an invocation that 
proceeded without incident occurred in the Town of Greece itself, 
when, in October of 2015, atheist Linda Stephens, one of the two 
plaintiffs in the Town of Greece v. Galloway case, gave a secular 
invocation in front of the very town board that she had sued and 
brought all the way to the Supreme Court.97  As I recount in Our 
Non-Christian Nation, I visited the town and observed the 
invocation and can testify that, other than one guy next to me who 
took his hat off when the chairperson of the town board announced 
the opening prayer and then put the hat back on when it became 
clear there would be no actual “prayer,” the invocation was received 
with politeness and respect.98 
On the other hand, there have been plenty of secular 
invocations that did not go nearly as smoothly as Stephens’ talk 
before the Town of Greece board.  Examples include the following: 
• After Athena Salman’s 2019 invocation before the
Arizona House of Representatives, John Kavanaugh, a
fellow Representative, ridiculed the invocation by
saying: “I would like to introduce my guest: God.  God
is in the gallery, as He is everywhere.  And the same
God who, by the way, created nature, which
97. Linda Stephens, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUND. (Oct. 20, 2015),
https://ffrf.org/publications/brochures/item/25276-linda-stephens 
[https://perma.cc/63Z4-4B3A]. 
98. See WEXLER, supra note 1, at 80–82.
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purportedly created this tiny speck of a planet in which 
this tiny speck of a legislature legislates.”99 
• When Joseph Richardson, member of the CFFC, gave
his secular invocation before a town commission
meeting in Eustis, Florida, Commissioner Anthony
Sabatini gave a Christian counter-invocation, calling
upon the “Lord” to “give us the strength to live like your
son Jesus Christ.”100
• At a secular invocation in Lake Forest, Florida, in
December, 2014, given by Atheist Preston Smith, four
out of the five town commissioners, including the
mayor, stood up and walked out of the room.101
• When Aleta Ledendecker, member of the Rationalists
of East Tennessee, gave an invocation in January of
2016 in front of the Oak Ridge City Council, one
councilwoman skipped the invocation, and another one
got up toward the end and walked out.  The one who
walked out—Rick Chinn—explained that he “couldn’t
take it anymore” because, in his opinion, “this country
was founded on Christian principles.”102
• After Athena Salman’s April 2017 invocation before the
Arizona House of Representatives, some Republicans
expressed offense, including Majority Leader John
Allen, who explained that invocations “must invoke a
higher power” and that “if you don’t want to pray, don’t
sign up for the prayer.”103
As described earlier, in the Introduction to the Article, several 
jurisdictions—specifically, Brevard County, Florida; the 
Pennsylvania House of Representatives; and the United States 
99. Mehta, supra note 96.
100. Mehta, supra note 96.
101. Chris Joseph, Lake Worth Commissioners Walk Out During Atheist In-
vocation, BROWARD/PALM BEACH NEW TIMES (Dec. 9, 2014), 
https://www.browardpalmbeach.com/news/lake-worth-commissioners-walk-
out-during-atheist-invocation-6463464 [https://perma.cc/MJ7C-MS9S]. 
102. Bob Fowler, Oak Ridge council members boycott secular invocation,
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House of Representatives—have gone even further than simply 
objecting on principle to secular invocations by actually 
implementing legal bans on them.104  From the perspective of 
religious pluralism, this is a terrible mistake, for the reasons I 
explained earlier.  But is it also unconstitutional?  The 
constitutional propriety of these bans is the topic of the next Part. 
III.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BANNING SECULAR INVOCATIONS
A. The Cases
1. Williamson v. Brevard County
The Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County (the
Board) on the central east coast of Florida has long started its public 
meetings with a prayer.  Four days after the Supreme Court decided 
Town of Greece, David Williamson, as the Chair of the CFFC, wrote 
a letter to the Chairwoman of the Board asking to give a secular 
invocation.105  It took Williamson a second letter to get a response 
from the Board, and the response was negative.106  The Board told 
Williamson that he could address the Board during the “Public 
Comment” portion of the meeting (which takes place at the end) but 
could not give the opening invocation, because that was reserved 
for prayers invoking a higher power.107  After several other 
individuals asked to give secular invocations and several 
separationist organizations asked the Board to reconsider its 
exclusionary policy, the Board issued an eleven-page Resolution 
announcing its formal policy that only those who believe in a higher 
power may give the opening invocation at its meetings.108  
Secularists were allowed address the Board, but only in the Public 
Comment section at the end of the meeting.109  
Williamson and several other plaintiffs sued the Board in 
federal district court, claiming that the county’s policy violated the 
104. See Williamson v. Brevard County., 276 F. Supp. 3d 1260 (M.D. Fla.
2017); Fields v. Speaker of Pa. H.R., 251 F. Supp. 3d 772 (M.D. Pa. 2017); 
Barker v. Conroy, 282 F. Supp. 3d 346 (D.D.C. 2017). 
105. Williamson, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 1266.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1266–67.
108. Id. at 1269.
109. Id. at 1270–71.
648 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:620 
Establishment Clause, as well as a number of other federal and 
state constitutional provisions.110  In a comprehensive opinion, 
District Court Judge John Antoon II found for the plaintiffs, finding 
that the exclusion of non-theists from the Board’s prayer program 
contravened Town of Greece’s anti-discrimination requirement as 
well as the Free Speech Clause’s prohibition on viewpoint 
discrimination in a designated public forum.111  As part of the 
proceedings, the plaintiffs’ lawyers deposed seven county 
commissioners and asked them questions about who could and 
could not offer opening invocations.112  Some of the answers ranged 
far beyond an interest in excluding Atheists and cast doubt on 
whether any non-monotheist would ever be allowed to give an 
invocation.113  For instance, several commissioners expressed 
uncertainty about whether Hindus, as polytheists, would be able to 
give invocations.114  Same for Native American religions.115  
Several commissioners said they would probably exclude Wiccans 
as well.116 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, but 
the three-judge panel found the Board’s invocation policy invalid on 
narrower grounds than the district court.117  In a unanimous 
opinion written by Judge Marcus, the court found the policy 
unconstitutional because, taken as a whole, the County 
Commission preferred certain religions over others.118  Part of this 
conclusion was based on the wording of the Resolution itself, which, 
in several places, explicitly expressed a preference for monotheistic 
invocations.119  For example, page two of the Resolution stated that,  
“[p]rior to the invocation, in recognition of the traditional positive 
role faith-based monotheistic religions have historically played in 
the community, the Board . . . offer[s] the [presenting] cleric the 
110. Id. at 1271.
111. Id. at 1299.
112. Id. at 1279.
113. Id. at 1279–80.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1280.
116. Id. at 1279.
117. See Williamson v. Brevard County, 928 F.3d 1298, 1310 (11th Cir.
2019). 
118. See id. at 1299.
119. See id. at 1311–12.
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opportunity to tell the Board . . . about their religious 
organization.”120  Another portion of the Resolution, according to 
the court, expressed skepticism about any belief system that 
“espouse[s] or promote[s] reason . . . science . . . environmental 
factors [and] nature.”121  “At the very least,” wrote the court, 
“‘environmental factors’ and ‘nature’ play a significant role in 
shaping some traditional Native American religions, not to mention 
some newer religions like Wicca.”122   
Beyond the language of the Resolution, the deposition 
testimony of the Commissioners dismayed, as it: “Reflect[ed] that 
the members put into practice the monotheistic preference 
endorsed in their written Resolution, and shows that members of 
the Board had no standards to apply, and minimal procedures to 
follow, as they invited speakers to give invocations.”123   
On the basis of the Resolution’s language and the deposition 
testimony, the court concluded that the Commissioners “have 
favored some religions over others, and barred those they did not 
approve of from being considered . . . plainly violat[ing] the principle 
of denominational neutrality found at the heart of the 
Establishment Clause.”124  The court remanded the case back to the 
district court with the expectation that the Commissioners would 
have a chance to “return to the drawing board and formulate new 
policies about how to begin the meetings.”125  As a result, the court 
did not specifically address the question of “whether the County is 
obliged to allow . . . atheists and Secular Humanists . . . the 
opportunity to deliver an invocation at the start of one of its board 
meetings.”126 
120. Williamson, 276 F. Supp. 3d at 1279 (quoting Brevard Coumty, Fla.,
Resolution 2015-101 (July 7, 2015) (emphasis in original)); see also Williamson, 
928 F.3d at 1311-12. 
121. Williamson, 928 F.3d at 1312.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1312–13.
124. Id. at 1316.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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2. Barker v. Conroy
Although the U.S. House of Representatives has a permanent,
paid Chaplain on staff to give a prayer at the beginning of each 
legislative session (currently the position is held by Father Patrick 
J. Conroy, a Catholic Priest127), since 1948 it has also employed a
“guest chaplain” program to allow other individuals who are either
invited by the Chaplain or sponsored by a member of the House to
offer the opening invocation.128  In 2015, Daniel Barker, an atheist
and co-President of the FFRF, asked Father Conroy if he could give
a secular invocation before the House.129  Conroy turned Barker
down on the basis that anyone who gives an invocation before the
House must address a “higher power.”130  Hardly litigation shy,
FFRF promptly sued, challenging the House’s policy as a violation
of the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause, among
other federal laws.131
Both the district court judge (Judge Rosemary Collyer) and a 
three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held in favor 
of the House.  Judge Collyer’s constitutional analysis took up a 
mere three pages of text and basically boiled down to the following 
three sentences:  
Despite Mr. Barker’s repeated attempts to characterize his 
claims as not challenging the constitutionality of legislative 
prayer, the reality is that his request to open the House 
with a secular invocation, which resulted in the denial of 
his request to serve as a guest chaplain, was a challenge to 
the ability of Congress to open with a prayer.  To decide 
that Mr. Barker was discriminated against and should be 
permitted to address the House would be to disregard the 
Supreme Court precedent that permits legislative prayer. 
Marsh definitively found that legislative prayer does not 
violate the Establishment Clause.132 
127. Barker v. Conroy, 282 F. Supp. 3d 350, 350–51, 354 (D.D.C. 2017).
128. Id. at 351.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 351–52.
132. Id. at 364.
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With liberal judges David Tatel and Harry Edwards assigned 
to the D.C. Circuit panel hearing the appeal in Barker v. Conroy 
(the third judge was conservative Judge Douglas Ginsburg), 
pluralists might be forgiven for being optimistic about the case.133  
If so, though, they were disappointed by the decision, which gave 
short shrift to Barker’s weighty claims, summarily affirming the 
district court in a few pages of thinly reasoned analysis.134  After 
reviewing Marsh and Town of Greece, Judge Tatel’s opinion 
distilled a simple “two-step process for assessing the 
constitutionality of a particular legislative prayer practice: identify 
the essential characteristics of the practice and then determine 
whether that practice falls within the tradition the Supreme Court 
has recognized as consistent with the Establishment Clause.”135  
After identifying the “essential characteristic” at issue with the 
House’s prayer practice as “limit[ing] the opening prayer to 
religious prayer,”136 the court then asked whether this “fit ‘within 
the tradition long followed in Congress and the state 
legislatures’?”137  “The answer,” wrote the court, “is yes”:138 
Marsh and Town of Greece leave no doubt that the Supreme 
Court understands our nation’s longstanding legislative-
prayer tradition as one that, because of its ‘unique history,’ 
can be both religious and consistent with the 
Establishment Clause. . . . And although the Court has 
warned against discriminating among religions or 
tolerating a pattern of prayers that proselytize or disparage 
certain faiths or beliefs, it has never suggested that 
legislatures must allow secular as well as religious prayer. 
In the sui generis context of legislative prayer, then, the 
133. See Mike Leonard, Atheist Loses Bid to Serve as U.S. House ‘Guest
Chaplin,’  BLOOMBERG LAW (Apr. 19, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-
law-week/atheist-loses-bid-to-serve-as-house-guest-chaplain 
[https://perma.cc/F8PS-LJ5S]. 
134. See Barker v. Conroy, 921 F.3d 1118, 1131–32 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
135. Id. at 1129–30.
136. Id. at 1130.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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House does not violate the Establishment Clause by 
limiting its opening prayer to religious prayer.139 
This was pretty much the entirety of the court’s reasoning. 
3. Fields v. Speaker of the Pennsylvania House of
Representatives
Like the U.S. House of Representatives, the Pennsylvania 
House also utilizes a guest chaplain program to allow non-members 
who are nominated by members to give the opening invocation. 
After several members of secular organizations requested the 
opportunity to “offer uplifting and inspirational messages” at the 
beginning of a House session,140 the House responded by amending 
its internal rules to add House Rule 17: “[t]he Chaplain offering the 
prayer shall be a member of a regularly established church or 
religious organization or shall be a member of the House of 
Representatives.”141  The rejected secularists sued, challenging the 
exclusion of non-believers from the House’s prayer practice as a 
violation of the Establishment Clause, among other constitutional 
provisions.142  The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint 
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.143  
In April 2017, Chief District Judge Christopher Conner issued 
an opinion denying in part defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding 
that the plaintiffs had indeed stated a claim under the 
Establishment Clause.144  Reading Town of Greece’s anti-
discrimination mandate as an independent constitutional 
requirement, the court found that the plaintiffs had successfully 
pled a colorable case of discrimination:  
Town of Greece installs a new metric in the legislative 
prayer analysis: when a legislature opens its door to guest 
chaplains and other prayer givers, it may not purposefully 
discriminate among them on the basis of religion.  The 
139. Id. at 1131.
140. Fields v. Speaker of the Pa. H.R., 251 F. Supp. 3d 772, 776 (M.D. Pa.
2017). 
141. Id. at 777 (quoting GEN. OPERATING RULES OF THE PA. H.R. r. 17).
142. Id. at 778.
143. See id. at 778–79.
144. Id. at 792.
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complaint articulates a plausible violation of this tenet. 
Plaintiffs allege that they are members of . . . minority 
religions, and that they have been purposefully excluded 
from the House’s guest chaplain program on the basis of 
their beliefs.145   
The court further explained that the more difficult questions posed 
by the case—“whether history and tradition sanctify the House’s 
line of demarcation between theistic and nontheistic chaplains,” for 
instance—“demands, and deserves” the type of factual record that 
could only be developed beyond the 12(b)(6) stage.146 
Following discovery and the filing of cross-motions for 
summary judgment, Judge Conner issued an opinion in August of 
2018 finding that the Pennsylvania House had violated the 
Establishment Clause by excluding atheist invocations.147  The 
court began its analysis by finding that nothing in the historical 
record demonstrated a tradition of explicitly excluding non-
believers from giving invocations.  “That history has tolerated the 
natural prevalence of theistic legislative prayer,” Judge Conner 
wrote, “is hardly evidence that the Framers would abide deliberate 
and categorical exclusion of nontheists.”148  Further, the court 
observed that while Justice Kennedy’s anti-discrimination 
language in Town of Greece might have technically been dicta, the 
admonition was nonetheless persuasive and consistent with the 
goal of protecting religious diversity, one of the key purposes of the 
Establishment Clause.149  After reviewing the district court 
decisions in Williamson and Barker and finding the former to be far 
more persuasive than the latter,150 the court concluded its analysis 
by rejecting the House’s argument that secular invocations cannot 
fulfill the purposes of legislative prayer, particularly the solicitation 
of “divine guidance for the benefit of the legislatures.”151  Rather, 
the court explained, secular invocations, as evidenced by the many 
145. Id. at 789.
146. Id.
147. Fields v. Speaker of the Pa. H.R., 327 F. Supp. 3d 749, 766 (M.D. Pa.
2018). 
148. Id. at 758.
149. Id. at 759–60.
150. Id. at 761–63.
151. Id. at 763.
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such invocations given in recent years, are fully capable of 
solemnizing the legislative process, lending gravity to the situation, 
and, as Justice O’Connor once put it, “encouraging the recognition 
of what is worthy of appreciation in society.”152 
The secularist victory at the district court level in Fields was 
short-lived, however.  In August of 2019, a divided Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision.153  The 
reasoning of the majority opinion, written by Judge Ambro, was 
quite similar to Judge Tatel’s analysis in Barker but somewhat 
more thorough.  The majority applied a historical framework and 
found that the exclusion of secularists was “historically sound” both 
because “only theistic prayer can satisfy all the traditional purposes 
of legislative prayer,”154 including “seek[ing] ‘divine guidance’ in 
lawmaking,”155 and because “the Supreme Court has long taken as 
given that prayer presumes invoking a higher power.”156  The court 
conceded that atheism and other secular belief systems could be 
understood as “religious” by contemporary standards, but found the 
possibility to be beside the point because even if it were true, an 
atheist invocation still could not fulfill the “divine guidance” 
purpose of legislative prayer.157  The court was careful to reject the 
House’s position that it need only allow more than one sect to 
partake in the prayer context, noting, for example, that “our 
reasoning today could not be twisted to exclude Buddhists—an 
outcome we agree would be ‘unconscionable,’”158 but it did not think 
it necessary to extend the nondiscrimination mandate of Town of 
Greece to nontheists.159  As a final point, the majority argued that 
a contrary result might cause “fringe” groups to seek to partake in 
the prayer practice, thus causing cities and towns to end their 
invocation programs altogether.160 “If, in the name of 
152. Id. at 763 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)). 
153. Fields v. Speaker of the Pa. H.R., 936 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2019).
154. Id. at 147, 150.
155. Id. at 151.
156. Id. at 150.
157. Id. at 153–54.
158. Id. at 155.
159. Id. at 155–56.
160. Id. at 157.
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nondiscrimination, the House must abide prayers from nontheists, 
Satanists, and groups that deride religion,” the court wrote, “it will 
stop accepting guest chaplains altogether . . . result[ing] in less 
diversity of religious expression—a ‘particularly perverse 
result.’”161 
Judge Restrepo wrote a substantial dissent.162  For him, the 
key historical inquiry was whether the express exclusion of 
nontheists was part of the historical practice of legislative 
prayer.163  The answer to that question, as Judge Restrepo put it, 
was “clearly ‘no’”164—indeed, it is clear from Senate and House 
documents issued in 1853, reviewing the prayer practices of both 
bodies, that the “history [of] legislative prayer never involved the 
purposeful exclusion of persons from consideration to serve as 
chaplains on the basis of their religions or religious beliefs.”165  The 
dissent did not stop there, however.  Moving on from his historical 
analysis and quoting Town of Greece’s warning that “Marsh must 
not be understood as permitting a practice that would amount to a 
constitutional violation if not for its historical foundation,”166 Judge 
Restrepo argued that even if the House’s practice was historically 
sound, it would still violate the Establishment Clause because it 
discriminated against nonbelievers.  He emphasized: 
By mandating that all guest chaplains profess a belief in a 
“higher power” or God, the Pennsylvania House fails to stay 
“neutral in matters of religious theory”; in effect, the 
Pennsylvania House “promote[s] one . . . religious theory”—
belief in God or some sort of supreme deity—“against 
another”—the denial of the existence of such a deity.167 
As I will argue in the next Section of this Part, Judge Restrepo’s 
approach to the question of whether the government can exclude 
secularists from its invocation practices makes the most sense of 
any that the judiciary has put forward up until now. 
161. Id.
162. See id. at 163–71 (Restrepo, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 165.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 166.
166. Id. at 167–68 (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576
(2014)). 
167. Id. at 168.
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B. Evaluating the Constitutionality of Secularist Exclusion
Policies
Two observations are worth making at the outset of figuring 
out how to apply Marsh and Town of Greece to the practice of 
excluding secularists from giving opening invocations, one that 
should be uncontroversial, the other somewhat more so.  First, 
anyone trying to figure out how these cases should be applied to 
new situations has to recognize and concede that there will be no 
clear or obvious answers.  In both cases, the Court announced one 
test (the historical practice test) without explaining in detail how to 
apply it, and then almost as an afterthought announced additional 
criteria (non-disparagement and nondiscrimination) without 
explaining what the criteria mean, how they should be applied, or 
even what the legal source or sources of the criteria are.168  By using 
such a minimalist approach to resolving the cases on the specific 
facts at issue, the Court has guaranteed that lower courts will 
rightly be confused about how to apply the cases, and commentators 
who argue that they should be applied one way or another should 
admit the same.  Thus, the analysis I provide in the balance of the 
Article should be understood in that way—I will put forward what 
I believe is the best understanding of how Marsh and Town of 
Greece should be applied to atheist exclusion policies, but I am 
hardly claiming that this understanding is obvious or that other 
understandings are necessarily unreasonable. 
The second observation—the one that is likely to be more 
controversial—is that Marsh, because of its highly anomalous 
approach and exceedingly thin reasoning, should be read as 
narrowly as possible.  In the dissent he wrote for himself, Justice 
Marshall, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice Brennan, 
catalogued the various ways that legislative prayer infringes on the 
values represented by the Establishment Clause: 
Legislative prayer clearly violates the principles of 
neutrality and separation that are embedded within the 
Establishment Clause . . . .  It intrudes on the right of 
conscience by forcing some legislators either to participate 
in a “prayer opportunity” with which they are in basic 
disagreement, or to make their disagreement a matter of 
168. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 783 (1983); see also Town of
Greece v. Galloway 572 U.S. 565, 585–88 (2014). 
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public comment by declining to participate.  It forces all 
residents of the State to support a religious exercise that 
may be contrary to their own beliefs.  It requires the State 
to commit itself on fundamental theological issues.  It has 
the potential for degrading religion by allowing a religious 
call to worship to be intermeshed with a secular call to 
order.  And it injects religion into the political sphere by 
creating the potential that each and every selection of a 
chaplain, or consideration of a particular prayer, or even 
reconsideration of the practice itself, will provoke a 
political battle along religious lines and ultimately alienate 
some religiously identified group of citizens.169 
Justice Brennan then concluded with a line quite remarkable in the 
history of Religion Clause jurisprudence both for its truth and its 
candor: “I have no doubt that, if any group of law students were 
asked to apply [established principles] to the question of legislative 
prayer, they would nearly unanimously find the practice to be 
unconstitutional.”170  To put it another way, although many 
difficult cases arise under the Establishment Clause, the case of 
legislative prayer is not one of them—it is clearly unconstitutional. 
The majority opinion, strikingly, neither applied established 
principles, eschewing the application of the Lemon test or anything 
like it, nor addressed in any way Justice Brennan’s various 
arguments against the practice of legislative prayer.171  Given the 
weakness of the opinion’s reasoning, there is no good reason for it 
to be extended beyond its precise holding—that a legislature can 
begin its session with a prayer without violating the Establishment 
Clause.172  The resolution of other related or subsidiary questions 
need not replicate the original failures of Marsh through an 
unreflective extension of its core holding.  Issues like the one I am 
discussing here should therefore not proceed through the routine 
application of the most anomalous and poorly reasoned 
Establishment Clause case in history, but rather through 
application of more generally accepted principles of the 
Establishment and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment.  
169. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 808 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 800–01.
171. See id. at 783–824.
172. Id. at 783.
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With these observations, then, we can begin to evaluate the 
decisions of the Third and D.C. Circuits in Fields and Barker.  As a 
first step, recall the reading of Marsh and Town of Greece set out 
earlier in Part I of the Article.  According to that reading, those 
cases stand for the proposition that the government may engage in 
a practice of starting sessions off with a prayer without violating 
the Establishment Clause if the practice generally fits within the 
historical tradition of such prayers in the United States, so long as 
(1) the practice does not advance a religious belief, denigrate non-
believers or minorities, or proselytize/preach conversion; (2) the
practice does not coerce non-believers into participating in the
prayer; and (3) the practice is non-discriminatory.173
This approach differs significantly from Judge Tatel’s 
framework in Barker v. Conroy, which basically included only one 
inquiry, divided into two steps: “identify the essential 
characteristics of the practice and then determine whether that 
practice falls within the tradition the Supreme Court has 
recognized as consistent with the Establishment Clause.”174  The 
problem with this approach is several-fold.  First, it ignores Town 
of Greece’s warning that “Marsh must not be understood as 
permitting a practice that would amount to a constitutional 
violation if not for its historical foundation.”175  An approach that 
asks solely whether the essential characteristics of a practice fall 
within historical tradition by its very terms would permit some 
practices that would in fact amount to constitutional violations. 
Examples of this constitute the second problem with Judge Tatel’s 
approach, which is that it would allow clearly unconstitutional and 
undesirable practices—given that almost everyone who ever gave 
an invocation in the course of that historical practice was surely 
male, white, and Christian.  Judge Tatel’s approach would 
presumably allow a town or state to prohibit Black or Asian or 
Hispanic individuals from giving invocations or to exclude women 
from giving prayers or to limit those prayers to only Christian ones.  
Finally, Judge Tatel’s framework leaves no room for the dicta of 
Marsh and Town of Greece concerning non-denigration, 
nondiscrimination, and non-proselytization; although that 
173. See supra Part I.
174. See Barker v. Conroy, 921 F.3d 1118, 1129–30 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
175. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014).
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language is dicta, it was clearly intended to be meaningful, and 
most courts that have looked at it have agreed.176 
Applying the framework that I have suggested, then, the first 
question is whether exclusion of atheists fits within the historical 
tradition of legislative prayer.  This question immediately leads to 
a second question: what exactly should we be looking for in the 
historical tradition to determine whether formal legal exclusion of 
secularists fits within that tradition?  We know from the expert 
report filed in Fields, as well as the 1853 House and Senate Reports 
on Congressional prayer, that (1) secularist invocations were not in 
fact part of the historical tradition because they never actually 
occurred, and that (2) they were likely never formally excluded by 
law, as they have been in the Pennsylvania and U.S. Houses as well 
as in Brevard County.177  So, does this mean that formal legal 
exclusion of secular invocations fits or does not fit within the 
historical tradition?  The dissent in Fields argues for the latter, 
finding that formal legal exclusion of secularists does not comport 
with the historical tradition.178  Judge Restrepo wrote: “[h]istory 
demonstrates that legislative prayer, as envisioned by the First 
Congress and as subsequently practiced by Congress since then, 
never involved the purposeful exclusion of persons from 
consideration to serve as chaplains on the basis of their religions or 
religious beliefs.”179   
This is a strong argument, in my view, particularly if one 
accepts my position that Marsh should be read as narrowly as 
possible.  The argument essentially says that unless discriminatory 
practices were explicitly written into the law during the historical 
period, then those practices cannot be used to justify current 
discrimination; it is a position that makes it more difficult rather 
than less difficult for the government to discriminate on the basis 
of religion and other essential characteristics, which is a result that 
seems self-evidently desirable.  On the other hand, it is certainly 
possible that the Court intended its historical tradition test to be 
applied less formalistically and that the sole question really should 
be whether secular invocations were common during the historical 
176. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95; Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 585.
177. See Fields v. Speaker of the Pa. H.R., 936 F.3d 142, 165–66 (3d Cir.
2019) (Restrepo, J., dissenting). 
178. See id. at 166.
179. Id. (emphasis in original).
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period.  That is the view of Judge Tatel in Barker and to some 
degree the majority opinion in Fields.180  Although I think the 
Fields’ dissent is probably the better view, it also becomes 
unnecessary if Town of Greece’s nondiscrimination proviso is taken 
seriously.  For that reason, if I were the one writing the opinion on 
this issue, I would likely not reach the historical tradition question 
and turn instead directly to applying Justice Kennedy’s 
nondiscrimination mandate. 
Doing that, and moving on to the fourth inquiry of my 
restatement of Marsh and Town of Greece, the question becomes 
whether excluding atheists and other secularists from giving 
invocations counts as “discrimination.”  Discrimination, of course, 
can mean many things, but given the seemingly constitutional 
source of the nondiscrimination requirement and the specific 
setting posed by issues of legislative prayer, two dimensions of the 
Court’s nondiscrimination jurisprudence seem most relevant: the 
requirement that the government treat all religions equally and the 
requirement that the government not distinguish among speakers 
in a designated public forum based on their viewpoint.  Both of 
these requirements point in the same direction—excluding 
secularist invocations is unconstitutional. 
First, the proposition that the government may not favor one 
religion over another religion is about as fundamental as any 
principle can be under the Religion Clauses.  As the Court famously 
put it in the 1982 case of Larson v. Valente, “[t]he clearest command 
of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination 
cannot be officially preferred over another.”181  In the context of 
legislative invocations, this must mean that the government cannot 
favor those who believe in a god or many gods over those who 
sincerely believe that there is no god or higher power.  Whatever 
one may think about whether atheism, or other comprehensive 
belief systems that reject the existence of a god, constitute 
“religions” outside of the constitutional context, it has to be the case 
that they are religions for purposes of the Establishment Clause.  
Otherwise, the government could promote the idea that there is no 
god as literal truth—a view that virtually nobody believes is correct. 
Even the majority opinion in Fields recognized that groups that 
180. See Barker v. Conroy, 921 F.3d 1118, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Fields, 936
F.3d at 1149.
181. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
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deny the existence of god are properly understood as “religions,” 
when it stated the following: “The nontheistic organizations that 
brought this challenge may be ‘religions’ for First Amendment 
purposes.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has moved considerably 
beyond the wholly theistic interpretation of the term religion.  Its 
understanding of religion now includes nontheistic and atheistic 
beliefs, as well as theistic ones.”182  It may be the case that allowing 
someone to give a Christian prayer before a legislative session does 
not violate the Establishment Clause, but that most definitely does 
not mean that the legislature can allow someone to give a Christian 
invocation but refuse to allow someone who does not believe in god 
to give a similar invocation.  The former proposition follows from 
Marsh and Town of Greece, but the latter does as well, through 
Town of Greece’s common-sense, fundamental-principle-
incorporating, nondiscrimination requirement.183 
Second, the idea that under the First Amendment’s Free 
Speech Clause the government may not discriminate against 
speakers on the basis of the viewpoint that they are espousing is 
only slightly less fundamental than the requirement of 
denominational neutrality under the Religion Clauses.  As the 
Court wrote in the flag-burning case of Texas v. Johnson: “[i]f there 
is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that 
the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply 
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”184  
Nor does this principle change simply because the speech takes 
place on government property or within the context of a government 
institution.  In those cases, the proper analysis looks to the so-called 
public-forum doctrine, which dictates that regardless of whether 
the speech is taking place in a traditional public forum, a 
designated public forum, or even a non-public forum, the 
government may still not discriminate against speech on the basis 
of viewpoint.185  Indeed, this is the principle under which the 
Supreme Court has held repeatedly that if a public school opens its 
182. Fields, 936 F.3d at 153 (citations omitted).
183. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 585–86 (2014).
184. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
185. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (“[A]ccess  to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject 
matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable 
in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.”). 
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property for use by after-school clubs and the like, it cannot exclude 
religious groups from using that property on the same terms that 
nonreligious groups are allowed to use it.186  Although it is not 
entirely clear whether a legislative invocation program is best 
characterized as a designated public forum or a non-public forum 
(my own view is that it is best understood as a designated public 
forum because it is intentionally opened up for a good deal of 
speech), ultimately it does not matter since even in a non-public 
forum, the Court has held that regulations of speech in such a place 
must be both reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.187  By allowing 
religious people of all different sects and stripes to give invocations 
but excluding those who do not believe in any divine being from 
speaking, the various jurisdictions that have adopted secularist 
exclusion policies have clearly discriminated against secularists on 
the basis of their viewpoint. Finding this exclusion unconstitutional 
should therefore not be a particularly difficult task. 
Although a straight-forward application of the relevant cases 
and constitutional principles should be sufficient to invalidate 
secularist exclusion policies, any judge or court who feels it either 
necessary or desirable to consider the pragmatic consequences of a 
decision one way or the other on the issue should find convincing 
practical reasons to find exclusion of secularists unconstitutional. 
These reasons are detailed above188 and involve, first and foremost, 
the importance of religious pluralism in public life.  From the 
perspective of religious pluralism, legislative prayer practices 
ought to strive to include speakers representing as many religious 
and nonreligious traditions as possible.  This must include not only 
representatives of minority religious beliefs, but those of 
nonreligious belief systems as well.  Allowing secularists and other 
nonbelievers to give occasional invocations before legislatures and 
town meetings will empower members of an otherwise 
marginalized group, send a symbolic message that everyone is an 
equal member of the community, and allow secularists to teach 
others what it means to be a nonbeliever, thus perhaps even leading 
to mutual understanding, respect, and social peace.  And, as the 
dissent in Fields persuasively explained, nothing is lost by allowing 
186. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384 (1993). 
187. See Barker v. Conroy, 921 F.3d 1118, 1129–30 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
188. See id.
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nonbelievers to give invocations; a secular invocation is just as 
capable of lending gravity to the meeting and performing the other 
functions of legislative prayer as religious invocations are.189 
None of this is to say that legislatures and town boards are 
foreclosed from placing some guidelines on what kinds of 
invocations can be given.  Obviously, nobody is entitled to give an 
invocation about topics that are completely unrelated to the 
legislative or governing process; there is no constitutional right to 
give a speech before a town meeting about one’s favorite hockey 
team or broccoli preparation method.  Fortunately, exclusion of 
such invocations would not be unconstitutional.  For one thing, as 
those invocations are neither about religion nor inspired by religion 
in any way, excluding them would not violate the denominational 
neutrality principle of Larson v. Valente.  Moreover, because the 
Court has held that the government can insist on subject matter 
distinctions (as opposed to viewpoint-based distinctions) in both 
limited public forums and nonpublic forums, it should be possible 
for legislatures and other governing bodies to craft, if they so 
choose, a rule limiting invocations to ruminations about how 
fundamental beliefs about the world relate to the governing 
process.  Of course, there may be difficulties with such a rule at the 
margins, but that is hardly a reason not to adopt a rule in the first 
place.  In order to ensure that the state does not discriminate on the 
basis of religious viewpoint, however, I would suggest something 
like the following standard: the government may not exclude from 
its invocation program any speaker who represents a belief system 
that, if it were taught by a public school as truth (or otherwise 
declared as truth by the government), it would violate the 
Establishment Clause’s prohibition on advancement of religion.  As 
noted above, since public schools clearly cannot teach atheism or 
nonbelief as truth, secularists must be included in the set of people 
who are allowed to give invocations. 190 
One final point about the majority’s decision in Fields is worth 
making.  The majority in that case argued that requiring the 
inclusion of nonbelievers in invocation programs would lead to 
“voices on the fringe” demanding the right to speak, which would in 
189. Fields v. Speaker of the Pa. H.R., 936 F.3d 142, 170 (2019) (Restrepo,
J., dissenting). 
190. See id. at 166.
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turn cause governmental bodies to cancel their guest invocation 
practices altogether, a negative result.  The court wrote: 
Taken too far, a nondiscrimination rule in legislative 
prayer provides a heckler’s veto to voices on the fringe.  If, 
in the name of nondiscrimination, the House must abide 
prayers from nontheists, Satanists, and groups that deride 
religion, it will stop accepting guest chaplains altogether. 
This will result in less diversity of religious expression—a 
“particularly perverse result.” . . .  In matters of promoting 
religious diversity, the perfect should not be the enemy of 
the good.191 
This observation suffers from several serious problems.  For 
one thing, since Satanists are in fact religious,192 Town of Greece 
already clearly prohibits the government from excluding them from 
invocation practices on the basis of their viewpoint, so inclusion of 
atheists in addition to Satanists seems unlikely to, by itself, have 
the feared effect.  But, more importantly, the paragraph gets 
constitutional law exactly backward.  The nondiscrimination 
mandates that flow from various constitutional provisions are 
designed to protect voices on the fringe.  That is their purpose.  
Popular voices do not need constitutional protection because they 
will prevail in the democratic process.  It is precisely the nontheists, 
Satanists, and other religious minorities that need and deserve the 
protection of the First Amendment.  If it turns out that the state is 
so worried about letting unpopular minorities speak before 
government meetings that it changes its invocation policy to 
exclude guest speakers altogether, that is the state’s prerogative, 
just as it was the prerogative of localities in the 1950s to close public 
swimming pools altogether rather than to allow African-Americans 
to swim alongside whites.  The state’s intolerance and prejudice 
toward minorities, in other words, cannot be used as an argument 
in favor of discrimination.  The fact that the Third Circuit majority 
thought it was proper to rely on such an argument truly renders 
most of the rest of its analysis untrustworthy and unpersuasive. 
191. Id. at 157.
192. See, e.g., Satanic Temple v. City of Scottsdale, 423 F. Supp. 3d 766,
775–78 (2020). 
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CONCLUSION 
Over the course of the last few decades, the Supreme Court has 
largely reduced the Establishment Clause to an empty shell.  As a 
result, religion now has greater access to public money, institutions, 
and property than perhaps ever before.  All of the cases in which 
the Court has allowed such increased access have, of course, 
involved claims by Christians, and with the results consistently 
coming out in their favor, the Christian majority has jumped on 
them to infiltrate public life with Christian symbols, speeches, and 
messages.  But the Supreme Court has also consistently held that 
the government may not discriminate on the basis of religion—as a 
result, religious minorities of all types, including atheists and other 
secularists, have also begun taking advantage of the Court’s 
jurisprudence to participate in public life by putting up their own 
symbols and displays on public property, starting their own after-
school clubs on public school property, asking for government 
funding, and—as detailed in this Article—giving their own 
invocations before government bodies.193  This increased religious 
pluralism in public life might, from the perspective of minorities, 
not be preferable to a secular public square in which the 
government supports no religion at all, but it is at least better than 
an entirely Christian public square.  The move by several 
jurisdictions to exclude secular invocations runs directly counter to 
the Court’s nondiscrimination, pro-pluralism approach to the 
Establishment Clause and should be rejected.  The government 
should allow, or indeed even encourage, secularists to partake in 
invocation programs in order to promote religious pluralism in 
American public life.  And, if the government insists on excluding 
secularists, then it will be up to the federal courts to hopefully 
reverse the current disturbing trend exemplified by the Third and 
D.C. Circuits and declare these secular exclusion policies
unconstitutional under both the Religion Clauses and the First
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.
193. See generally WEXLER, supra note 1.
